environment requires counterinsurgents to not only determine the kinds of weapons to use and how to employ them but also establish whether lethal means are...
Pokaż mi serce nie opętane zwodniczymi marzeniami, a pokażę ci człowieka szczęśliwego.
(FM 27−10 discusses forbidden 165The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual means of waging war.) Soldiers and Marines require an innate understanding of the effects of their actions and weapons on all aspects of the operational environment. Leaders must consider not only the first− order, desired effects of a munition or action but also possible second− and third−order effects—including undesired ones. For example, bombs delivered by fixed−wing close air support may effectively destroy the source of small arms fire from a building in an urban area; however, direct−fire weapons may be more appropriate due to the risk of collateral damage to nearby buildings and noncombatants. The leader at the scene assesses the risks and makes the decision. Achieving the desired effects requires employing tactics and weapons appropriate to the situation. In some cases, this means avoiding the use of area munitions to minimize the potential harm inflicted on noncombatants located nearby. In situations where civil security exists, even tenuously, Soldiers and Marines should pursue nonlethal means first, using lethal force only when necessary.
7−37. The principles of discrimination in the use of force and proportionality in actions are important to counterinsurgents for practical reasons as well as for their ethical or moral implications. Fires that cause unnecessary harm or death to noncombatants may create more resistance and increase the insurgency's appeal—especially if the populace perceives a lack of discrimination in their use. The use of discriminating, proportionate force as a mindset goes beyond the adherence to the rules of engagement. Proportionality and discrimination applied in COIN require leaders to ensure that their units employ the right tools correctly with mature discernment, good judgment and moral resolve.
DETENTION AND INTERROGATION
7−38. Detentions and interrogations are critical components to any military operation. The nature of COIN
operations sometimes makes it difficult to separate potential detainees from innocent bystanders, since insurgents lack distinctive uniforms and deliberately mingle with the local populace. Interrogators are often under extreme pressure to get information that can lead to follow−on operations or save the lives of non−
combatants, Soldiers, or Marines. While enemy prisoners in conventional war are considered moral and legal equals, the moral and legal status of insurgents is ambiguous and often contested. What is not ambiguous is the legal obligation of Soldiers and Marines to treat all prisoners and detainees according to the law. All captured or detained personnel, regardless of status, shall be treated humanely, and in accordance with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and DODD 2310.01E. No person in the custody or under the control of DOD, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, in accordance with, and as defined in, U.S. law. (Appendix D provides more guidance on the legal issues concerning detention and interrogation.)
LIMITS ON DETENTION
7−39. Mistreatment of noncombatants, including prisoners and detainees is illegal and immoral. It will not be condoned. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 makes the standard clear: No person in the custody or under the effective control of the Department of Defense or under detention in a Department of Defense facility shall be subject to any treatment or technique of interrogation not authorized by and listed in the United States Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation [FM 2−22.3] .
No individual in the custody or under the physical control of the United States Government, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.
7−40. In COIN environments, distinguishing an insurgent from a civilian is difficult and often impossible.
Treating a civilian like an insurgent, however, is a sure recipe for failure. Individuals suspected of insurgent or terrorist activity may be detained for two reasons:
To prevent them from conducting further attacks.
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To gather information to prevent other insurgents and terrorists from conducting attacks. These reasons
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